By William Sweet (auth.), William Sweet (eds.)
Today, whilst systematic philosophy - and cause itself - are challenged either open air of and inside of philosophy, is it nonetheless attainable to do metaphysics? This quantity offers a vast point of view on modern ways to the character and the basic questions of metaphysics. Drawing on students from continental Europe, Asia, Canada, the U.S., and nice Britain, and representing numerous philosophical cultures and traditions, this quantity surveys and extends paintings in metaphysics and its implications for broader philosophical matters (e.g., in ethics and social philosophy, in arithmetic and good judgment, and in epistemology). It additionally addresses such questions because the function of background and historicity in project metaphysics, the character of metaphysics, the concern of metaphysics over epistemology, and the demanding situations of empiricism and postmodernism.
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Extra info for Approaches to Metaphysics
For, according to St. Thomas, Sent. ad 2, the univocal, the equivocal, and the analogical are divided each in its own way: for the equivocal is divided in function of SIGNIFIED THINGS [secundum res significatas]; while the univocal [is divided] in function of DIVERSE DIFFERENCES [secundum diversas differentias]; but the analogical [is divided] in function of DIVERSE MODES [or measures] [secundum diversos modos]. Hence, since a being [ens] is predicated analogically of the ten categories, it is divided among them in function of diverse modes [or measures]; hence, to each is owing its proper mode of predicating.
I would willingly speak of a “natural intuition of being” in its regard. After all, it is the very first act in “the understanding of indivisibles” [indivisibilium intelligentia],71 certainly not the fruit of reasoning or even of composition and division. But it is no accident that metaphysicians generally fill their discourse with such notions as “identity,” “itself,” etc. These are modes of unity, not of being. Unity is already a complex notion, compared to being, and is much easier to imagine.
132B] Capreolus says: ... “a being” [ens] does not say “what” concerning any creature, because of no creature is its essence or quiddity being [esse]. ” But “a being” [ens] is taken from being [esse]. [144A] We see that we are at a very fundamental level of metaphysics here. Scotus’s last argument is: … as per Metaph. 3 and 4, “a being” is not a genus, because it pertains to the notion [est de intellectu] of everything whatsoever; but if it were not univocal it could be outside the notion of some; therefore, “a being” is univocal.